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disparage the union so long as his words do not imply a threat of
retaliation. He may express his opinion as to the benefits or lack of
benefits to be obtained by the employees if they unionize, and he can
probably make it known that he thinks that unionization might cause
him to close down because of the increased costs, and that it might
result in the adoption of a system of seniority, causing the discharge
of new employees. In short, there is practically no limitation upon
the topics upon which the employer may speak or write, so long as
his expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit. All this presupposes, of course, that the employer's attitude
and tone of voice while uttering these otherwise innocuous expressions, are not such as ii themselves to be coercive.
Under no circumstances, however, can we forget that in many
parts of the country the unions have made no deep inroads even
today, and so the employer remains omnipotent so far as his employees are concerned. In such areas conditions are substantially
those which caused the enactment of the Wagner Act, and which
caused the Board to apply the term "coercion" rather freely. Wherever this is the case, the realization is unavoidable that the Board
and the courts must remain ever alert to catch those subtle expressions of the employer which, by their tone or wording, imply that
the employee had better be receptive, or else!
PAUL L. HERZOG,
HOwAmI) A. RIKOON.

LiAILITY OF OCCUPIER OF LAND TO UNDISCOVERED
TRESPAssER

One has often heard the saying that a man's home is his castle.
In not many other fields of the law is this adage more vividly illustrated than in the field of the law of negligence wherein it appears
that an occupier of land is not liable for injury to an undiscovered
trespasser.
It is a settled rule of law, that, generally speaking, an occupier
of land is not subject to liability for an injury to atrespasser of whose
presence the occupier was unaware.1 By entering upon the property
of another without being invited to do so, the trespasser violates the
right of the possessor of the land to exclusive possession and control.
1 Prondecka v. Turner Falls Power & E. Co., 241 Mass. 100, 134 N. E.
352 (1922); Weitzmann v. Barber Asphalt Co., 190 N. Y. 452, 83 N. E. 477
(1908); Panunzio v. State, 266 App. Div. 9, 41 N. Y. S. 2d 587 (3d Dep't
1943).
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It necessarily follows that having violated the rights of another to
the exclusive enjoyment of his property, the trespasser must be
deemed to have assumed all the risks and dangers incident to his
unlawful act of trespass. From this it may be inferred that the reason
for the rule is not so much that the trespasser is a wrongdoer, but
that the law gives greater recognition to the rights of a possessor of
property. "The true explanation seems to be merely that, in a civilization based on private ownership, it is considered a socially desirable
policy to allow a man to use his own land in his own way, without
the burden of watching for and protecting those who come there
without permission or right." 2
It is axiomatic that any ordinary use of land by an owner is
lawful, and therefore no person by unlawfully intruding upon the
land of another, can by his own wrongful deed, change a lawful use
of property into an unlawful act against him, a trespasser a In the
use of his land, the occupier may, indeed, even be guilty of negligence
and still the undiscovered trespasser may not complain. In order
for negligence to be actionable the actor must owe the injured party
a duty, created either by contract or operation of law, and since the
law, as we have seen, prefers the property interests of the landholder
over the personal interests of the trespasser it is manifest that no duty
arises to maintain the property in suitable condition or to conduct
lawful operations on the property in such a manner as to insure freedom of the trespasser from bodily harm. In fact, the rule has even
been extended to include an immunity from liability for gross negligence by the occupier of land 4 But a word of caution is necessary
here. Some courts have inferred that when the negligence was so
gross as to show a complete disregard of others in the sense that the
injury inflicted was probably wilful, then the occupier should be
liable. 5 This note of caution is necessary because the rule of immunity does not extend to wilful or wanton injury Thus a possessor
of land who intends to cause injury to another, even a trespasser, is
guilty of actionable negligence. In this situation the occupier is under
a positive duty to refrain from any such conduct whether he is on his
own property or not, and if he acts otherwise, he does so at his peril.
Unless, however, there is wilful or wanton injury, the rule, in
short, is that no liability occurs for there is no duty on the part of
the occupier to insure freedom from bodily harm. This rule was
succinctly stated'by Mr. Chief Justice McSherry i the case of West
Virginia Central & P. R. R. v. State 6 wherein the learned Chief
Justice states, "In every instance, before negligence can be predicated
of a given act, back of the act must be sought and found a duty to
2
PROssEp, TORTS 611 (1941).
8
Ehret v. Village of Scarsdale, 269 N. Y. 198, 199 N. E. 56 (1935).

4Xhinoveck v. Boston & Maine R. R., 210 Mass. 170, 96 N. E. 52 (1911).

5Indianapolis Ry. v. McBrown, 46 Ind. 229 (1874); Lafayette R. R. v.

Adams, 26 Ind. 76 (1866).
6 96 Md. 652, 54 AUt. 669 (1903).
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the individual complaining, the observance of which would have
averted or avoided the injury." 7
This same rule of immunity has long been in existence in England 8 and, in fact, prevails to this day. In the recent case of Adams
v.Naylor 9 decided by the Court of Kings Bench in 1944, an interesting application of the doctrine was made. In 1941, during the
height of the Second World War, certain English military authorities entered onto a plot of land composed of sand dunes. On the
tract the authorities laid an extensive minefield. It appears that in
peaqe time the public had free access to this tract and, indeed, children had been accustomed to use it as a playground. The minefield
was enclosed by a six-feet high barbed wire fence and notices of danger were posted. In August, 1942, three boys entered the minefield
to recover a ball, one of them came into contact with a mine which
exploded, and, as a result, one of the boys was killed and a second
injured. The parents of the victims claimed that the defendant, the
army officer in control of the field, was liable as the occupier of the
land at that time. The defendant alleged as a defense, inter alia,
that the boys were undiscovered trespassers.
The court held that the parents could not recover because the
boys were trespassers on the land. Lord Justice MacKinnon, in the
course of his opinion, stated: "When the boys got inside the enclosure I think they were clearly trespassers, and prima facie, a trespasser can have no claim against the owner or occupier of land for
damages sustained by him from any dangerous thing on the land." ' 0
This English decision is clearly in accord with the American authorities on the subject and, moreover, is extremely logical in its application of the rule, even though the army officer was only in
temporary occupation of the minefield. Whether the possession is
temporary or permanent, is immaterial. The same immunity is
granted since, manifestly, temporary occupation can be just as exclusive as a permanent holding, and it therefore follows as a consequence that no duty to the trespasser arises in such a situation.
In considering the application of the above enunciated rule to
specific factual situations, the courts have discussed two possible
phases of the matter. The decisions have considered the duty of an
occupier to put his land in a condition reasonably safe for those who
choose to- traverse it; and have also weighed the obligation of the
occupier to refrain from negligently operating the premises so as to
avoid injury to those choosing to trespass upon it.
796 Md. 652, 666, 54 Atl. 669, 671 (1903). Chief Justice McSherry also
said at page 667, "The duty owed to a trespasser on a right of way is measurably less than the duty owed to the same person when not a trespasser but
when entirely off the right of way."
t Grand Trunk Ry. of Canada v. Barnett, [1911] A. C. 361; Lygo v.
Newbold, 9 Ex. 302, 156 Eng. Rep. 130 (1854).
9 [1944] 1 K. B. 750; accord, Addie & Sons, Ltd. v. Dimbreck, [1929] A. C.

358.

10

[1944] 1 K. B. 750, 761.
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In the first category, the courts have uniformly held that a trespasser enters at his own risk and takes the property just as he finds
it, including any hidden or unexposed dangers, and that the occupier
is not bound to maintain his property in first-class shape for the protection of trespassers. At first blush, this rule would seem to be elementary, but it must be remembered that the courts, for years, have
struggled with the problem as to whether property interests or personal interests should prevail, and the solution of this problem is not
as simple as it would seem. This will be evident, a little later on in
this note, when the rights of infant trespassers are considered under
the doctrine of attractive nuisances. The broken body of an infant
is convincing testimony for social minded judges who have definitely veered from the property concept. Indeed, it has already been
pointed out that the personal interest prevails where the occupier is
guilty of wilful, wanton conduct. Moreover, it may be pointed out
that the trespasser, although a wrongdoer, is not an outlaw and therefore some degree of care must be taken when his presence is
discovered.
One of the leading cases to come before the courts on this phase
of the subject is Lary v. Cleveland R. R.11 In that case the plaintiff
and a group of young people took refuge under the platform of a
freight house of the defendant railroad during a rainstorm. The
act of taking refuge was a pure intrusion on the part of the plaintiff
and his group, there being no invitation by the railroad in any manner. It appears that part of the roof of the freight house was missing
and during the course of the storm a further piece of the roof was
torn off. The plaintiff became frightened and he ran out from under
the roof, was struck by the piece of the roof and was injured. He
sued the railroad for negligently failing to repair the roof. The court
held that the defendant was not liable for the plaintiff's injuries being
under no obligation to maintain the building in a safe condition.
With respect to this obligation, the court said: "The appellant was
a trespasser, and as such he entered upon the appellee's premises,
taking the risks of all the mere omissions of the appellee as to the
2
condition of the grounds and buildings thus invaded without leave." 1
Here then is a striking recognition of the doctrine of immunity
granted to the property holder even though the premises are in a
palpable state of disrepair. In spite of the fact that the defendant
might have been negligent, even grossly negligent, in failing to repair its freight depot, the railroad was deemed to be free from
liability.
It has been said that the trespasser, by entering upon the property wrongfully, accepts the risks incident to his unlawful act. Carrying this rule to its logical conclusion the possessor of land is not liable
even where he maintains unguarded or unprotected openings, ele1178 Ind. 323 (1881).
12 78

Ind. 323, 326 (1881).
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vator shafts, pits or other conditions unsafe for ordinary passages
and the trespasser falls into the dangerous openings and is injured.
Thus, it has been held that a trespasser who falls through an
unprotected hole in a private bridge may not recover.13 Likewise
it has been held that a trespasser who fell down an unguarded elevator shaft, also, may not recover for the possessor's negligence in
leaving the shaft in such a condition. 1 4 In the case of elevator shafts
the decisions are not entirely harmonious, but a close inspection indicates that the decision usually turns on the question as to whether
the individual was actually a trespasser, or a licensee, or even an
invitee. Manifestly, a greater, degree of care should be observed
where the person injured is an invitee, because the entry and use of
the premises are lawful and the occupier is under a duty to provide
a safe means of passage or to give adequate notice of the unsafe
condition.' 5
The rule prohibiting trespassers from recovering where the
premises are maintained in an unsafe condition, is also applicable to
the case of a licensee. A licensee is a person who is privileged to
come upon the land by virtue of the possessor's consent. However,
he comes on the land for his own purposes, not for any benefit to the
occupier and therefore has no right to expect the premises to be put
in safe condition for his reception. Indeed, the only thing that distinguishes a licensee from a trespasser is consent and it is for this
reason that he is sometimes called a "bare" licensee. The rule of
non-liability, therefore, is equally applicable to a licensee. In fact,
the courts, when stating the rule applicable to a particular situation,
usually point out that the licensee is considered in the same category
as a trespasser. 16 In many cases the plaintiff is referred to as a licensee where in truth he is really a trespasser, but this is to put the
plaintiff in as favorable a position as possible, so as to show the extent
of the rule of immunity.' 7 In England, however, the rule is different.
There a licensee is entitled to a duty of "care and protection accordingly" 18 from the occupant of land.
In the second category, the courts consider the use of the premises by the occupier and the conduct of negligent operations in such
use. For example, in the course of the occupier's business, he may
place dangerous machinery or other contrivances on the land, and the
question arises as to whether the occupier is liable to the trespasser
if he is injured by the occupier's dangerous machinery. The courts
Is Cusick v. Adams, 115 N. Y. 55, 21 N. E. 673 (1889) ; Gallagher v. Fordham & Loring Corp., 13 N. Y. S. 2d 322 (City Ct. 1939).
14 Flanagan v. Sanders, 138 Mich. 253, 101 N. W. 581 (1904).
25 Cf. Gotch v. K. & B. Packing & Provision Co., 25 P. 2d 719 (1933).
18 1 THOMPSON, NEGLIGENCE § 945 (1901).
17 Fox v. Warner-Quinlan Asphalt Co., 204 N. Y. 240, 97 N, E. 497 (1912);
Birch v. City of N. Y., 190 N. Y. 397, 83 N. E. 51 (1907); cf. Carbone v.
Mfackchil Realty Corp., 296 N. Y. 154, 158, 71 N. E. 2d 447, 448 (1947).
is Hardy v. Central Ry., [1920] 3 K. B. 459, 472, 473.
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have uniformly answered this question in the negative. Thus, the
liability of the occupier, or, more correctly, his nonliability, in this
category is the same as that where the occupier maintains his premises in an unsafe condition. And this is a salutary rule, since, so long
as the occupier does not interfere with the rights of the public, he
has a perfect right to conduct on his premises any lawful business and
he may use his property for any lawful purpose, although such use
may entail an element of danger and possibility of injury to persons
coming upon the property unlawfully. Therefore the occupier may
place upon the property such buildings, machinery, rolling stock or
other articles as may be necessary and convenient for his lawful use,
and, even if the occupier is negligent in his operation of all of these
things, he is immune from liability to the trespasser.
It is evident that in the use of highly dangerous machinery some
possibility of harm may be anticipated if anyone comes in contact
with it. Must the occupier of land anticipate the probability that
trespassers will intrude upon his land, and, knowing the injurious
character of his machinery, must he then take necessary steps to insure the trespasser's safety? It appears that, generally speaking,
the occupier of private property may safely engage in ordinary work
and conduct his operations in a customary manner without incurring
liability therefor, even though danger may be anticipated because of
the operations conducted, since the occupier is entitled to assume that
ordinary individuals will obey the law.' 9
This also seems to be the rule in the English' courts.2 0
The question of anticipation very frequently arises in cases
where railroads are charged with injuring persons walking along the
tracks, or in some other manner using the railroad's right of way.
The majority of courts have felt that it would be imposing too great
a burden to require the railroads to foresee a proposed trespass, and
therefore hold that they are not under a duty to anticipate or look
out for them. To hold otherwise would require a railroad to guard
every mile of its tracks in order to forestall the possibility of intrusion by trespassers. 21
New York is in accord with this majority rule. It has been
said in a well considered New York case involving injuries to a trespasser by a railroad that "Primarily it was the engineer's duty to run
his train on schedule time and guard the safety of the passengers.
It was not his duty to watch for trespassers on the track. He had a
right to assume that people would obey the law." 22
A case which aptly illustrates the general rule with respect to
railroads, is Sheehan v. St. Paul & D. Ry. 23 In that case, the plain2209 Zartner
Lowery
21

v. George, 156 Wis. 131, 145 N. W. 971 (1914).
v. Walker, [1911] A. C. 10.
Hank v. Great Northern R. R., 131 Minn. 281, 154 N. W. 1088 (1915).
22 Capitula v. New York Centrdl 1R.R, 213 App. Div. 526, 528, 210 N. Y.
Supp. 651, 653 (3d Dep't 1925).
23 76 Fed. 201 (C. C. A. 7th 1896).
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tiff, while walking on defendant's tracks, caught his foot in an iron
cattle guard, and, being unable to remove the foot before a locomotive, moving backward, came upon him, was struck by the train which
severed his foot. The court held, Judge Seaman writing the opinion,
that the defendant was not liable as the plaintiff was a trespasser upon
the defendant's property. With respect to the matter of anticipating
the intrusion, the court said, "Is it, however, bound to foresee or
assume that rational beings will thus enter as trespassers in a place
of danger, and to exercise in the running of its trains the constant
vigilance in view of the probability which is imposed for public crossings? ... The more reasonable doctrine is pronounced, in effect, as
follows: That the railroad company has the right to a free track in
such places; that it is not bound to any act or service in anticipation
of trespassers thereon; and that the trespasser who ventures to enter
upon a track for any purpose of his own assumes all risks of the conditions which may be found there, including the operation of engines
and cars." 24
Thus an examination of the decisions reveals that, with respect
to negligent operations conducted on private property, the rule of
immunity granted by the law to the occupier is again predicated upon
a lack of duty owing to the intruder. And it is submitted that sociological considerations should not be permitted to outweigh cold logical reasoning in this connection. To allow recoveries to trespassers
in these situations would require business and manufacturing establishments to exercise eternal vigilance to avoid injuries which they
did not initiate. The law should not compel businessmen to shut
down their 25
gates and stop their businesses for the protection of
wrongdoers.
It has already been noted that, if an occupier of land is guilty
of wilful, wanton injury, he is liable for damages even to a trespasser. 28 In addition to this qualification to the general rule as heretofore stated, it must be pointed out that a few courts have taken the
minority view and have allowed recoveries to trespassers where the
occupier himself was negligent. 27 But this ftfrther qualification appears to be based upon a novel refinement between active and passive
negligence. It is said that if the occupier negligently sets in motion
any destructive agency or force the natural tendency of which would
be to injure an individual, even a trespasser, then the occupier is
liable.28 The principle has been stated by the North Carolina Su24 76
25

Fed. 201, 204 (C. C. A. 7th 1896).
Cf. Buch v. Amory Manufacturing Co., 69 N. H. 257, 262, 44 Ad. 809,

811 (1898).
26 See note 5 mtpra.

27 Lovett v. Salem & So. D. R. R., 9 Allen 557 (Mass. 1865); Norris v.
Litchfield, 35 N. H. 271 (1857) ; Kerwhacker v. Cleveland, C. & C. R. R., 3

Ohio
2 8 St. 172 (1854).
See Rome Furnace Co. v. Patterson, 120 Ga. 521, 523, 48 S.E. 166, 167
(1904).
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preme Court, as follows: ' The rule established by the authorities in
this and other jurisdictions is that, while the owner of the premises
is not liable to a trespasser, bare or permissive licensee . . unless
the injury results from the wilful and wanton negligence of the owner,
yet this rule is usually restricted to injuries resulting from existent
conditions upon the premises, or what is termed passive negligence.
Upon the other hand, the owner is liable for any injuries brought
about and caused by active negligence in the management or operation of the business or control -of the premises which would increase
the hazard to the licensee or trespasser." 29
Thus, it will be seen that in some jurisdictions a recovery may
be had by a trespasser, even where there is no wilful or wanton conduct on the part of the landholder. But the difficulty in applying
such a rule is in determining an exact and workable distinction between active and passive negligence.
In New York, and in the majority of the states, the liability for
active negligence is confined to the case of a licensee and is categorically denied in the case of a trespasser. 30
It is interesting to note that the Restatement of the Law of
Torts 31 supports the general proposition to the effect that a possessor of land is not subject to liability for bodily harm caused to
trespassers. The Restatement, likewise, separates the rule into two
separate phases, namely, a failure to exercise reasonable care to put
the land in a condition reasonably safe for a trespasser's reception,
or a failure to carry on activities so as not to endanger trespassers.
The Restatement, likewise, recognizes
the limitation to the rule in
32
the case of wilful or wanton injury.
The scope of this note is confined to cases of undiscovered trespassers. It may be stated, however, that an exception to the general
rule of immunity, is a case where the occupier discovers the peril of
the trespasser. In such a situation, a duty arises on the part of the
occupier to make all reasonable efforts to avert injury to the trespasser. Where the presence of the trespasser becomes known, the
occupier is put on notice and he must then act as a reasonably prudent man in order to avoid unnecessary injury. But it may be said
that this duty to avert injuries is negative in character, since, as we
have seen, the possessor of land is not liable for his mere omissions
with regard to the conditions of the premises.3 3
29

Brigman v. Fiske-Carter Construction Co., 192 N. C. 791, 796, 136 S. E.
125, 128 (1926); accord, Southcote v. Stanley, 1 H. & N. 248, 156 Eng. Rep.
1196 (Ex. 1856). See also the excellent annotations on this subject in 49
A. L. R. 778 and 156 A. L. R. 1226.
30 Weitzmann v. Barber Asphalt Co., 190 N. Y. 452, 83 N. E. 477 (1908);
Zaia v. Lalex Realty Corp., 261 App. Div. 843, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 183 (2d Dep't
1941); Rosenthal v. New York, S. & W. R. R., 112 App. Div. 431, 98 N. Y.
Supp. 476 (1st Dep't 1906).
81 REsTATEMENT, ToRTs § 333 (1934).
82 Id comment d.
83 Cf. Preston v. Austin, 206 Mich. 194, 172 N. W. 377 (1919); Union
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In a discussion of the exceptions to the rule, the thought comes
to mind as to whether infant trespassers are to be considered in a
more favorable position than a person endowed with sufficient reason
to understand the nature of his act. An examination of the decisions
reveals that, on this phase of the subject, much controversy on the
part of the courts exists. To begin with, practically all courts, with
unanimity, hold that generally speaking an infant is entitled to no
greater rights than bn adult and that no recovery may be had. 34 But
a qualification has crept into the law in many jurisdictions where the
occupier has failed to take proper precautions to prevent injuries to
children by contrivances, machines or conditions on the land, which
the occupier, as a prudent individual, should have known would naturally attract or allure them into unsuspected danger. This qualification is known as the attractive nuisance doctrine, or the doctrine of
the turntable cases. It is this qualification that has caused a great
conflict in opinion in the several states. Manifestly, judges entertaining social-minded concepts would seize upon this doctrine wherever possible to break away from the long settled rule of immunity
granted to property owners. The doctrine itself has been a part of
the law for many years, having originated in an English case decided
in 1841.I
In the United States the leading case on the subject is
Sioux City R. R. v. Stout8 6 where a young child was injured playing
on a railroad turntable. It is from this case that the doctrine in the
United States derives its name, the "turntable" doctrine.
In New York the doctrine has not been accepted. The leading
New York case is Walsh v. The Fitchburg R. R.37 which was also a
case involving injuries received from a railroad turntable. There it
was held that the possessor of land was not liable to an infant trespasser and the allurement of the turntables to children could not be
considered an implied invitation to enter upon the property. In a
recent New York case the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the rule laid
down in the Walsh case and stated once again that
the doctrine of
88
attractive nuisances does not apply in New York.
But some New York courts, recognizing the harshness of the
holdings and the need for some amelioration, have sought to distinNews Co. v. Freeborn, Ill Ohio St. 105, 144 N. E. 595 (1924); Zartner v.
George, 156 Wis. 131, 145 N. W. 971 (1914).
3- Carbone v. Mackchil Realty Corp., 296 N. Y. 154, 71 N. E. 2d 447 (1947);
Mendelowitz v. Neisner, 258 N. Y. 181, 179 N. E. 378 (1932); Zaia v. Lalex
Realty
35 Corp., 261 App. Div. 843, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 183 (2d Dep't 1941).
Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29, 133 Eng. Rep. 1041 (1841):
30 17 Wall. 657, 21 L. ed. 745 (U. S. 1873).
37 145 N. Y. 301, 39 N. E. 1068 (1895).
In Tierney v. New York Dugan
Bros., 288 N. Y. 16, 41 N. E. 2d 161 (1942), a recovery was allowed where a
child was injured on one of the defendant's trucks on the public highway. The
decision was based on the fact that the vehicle was a dangerous attraction on
the public highway, not on private property, and the Walsh v. Fitghburg R. R.
case was thus distinguished.
asMorse v. Buffalo Tank Corp., 280 N. Y. 110, 19 N. E. 2d 981 (1939).
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guish the doctrine and have struggled to discover some means of
liability. 39 For example, the Appellate Division, Third Department,
in a case decided in June, 1946,40 granted a recovery in an action for
the death of a six-year-old girl who had fallen down an elevator shaft
while playing upon the defendant's property. The court held in that
case that the rule of nonliability for attractive nuisances, as laid down
in the Walsh case, should not be rigidly applied. The court felt that,
under the peculiar facts present, the defendant was liable. In the
course of its opinion the court made the interesting observation that:
"The doctrine as to nonliability for injury caused by 'attractive
nuisance' had for its foundation the necessities of industry and enterprise, and also perhaps the preservation of a freedom for one to do
as he pleases with his own on his own." 41 Apparently the court felt
that the basis for the rule had, under modem conditions, ceased to
exist.
This case was followed by a very recent case which came before
the Court of Appeals in January, 1947.42 Incidentally, the case came
up on an appeal from the Appellate Division, Third Department,
which, as we have noted, adopted an extremely liberal viewpoint. In
that case, three young boys were injured when one of the walls of
an abandoned foundation collapsed. The plaintiffs contended that the
site of the foundation was more of an allurement to children than
the turntable in the Walsh case, and that the defendant had notice
that children were seen at play on the site. The court held, however,
that the infants were, at best, bare licensees and that the general rule
of nonliability towards trespassers and licensees applied.
Briefly considering, then, the results of all of the authorities on
the general question of liability to a trespasser, we find that, from a
historical standpoint, the New York courts have consistently adhered
to the property concept and have concluded that the rights of the
property owner are entitled to greater protection than the personal
interests of the trespasser. The New York courts have even stood
firm in the cases of infant trespassers where sympathetic tendencies
of liberal-minded judges are more apt to be evident. But, as we have
seen, under the present state of the law, a note of dissension has
arisen among a few New York judges who seem to feel that the
preservation of personal interests is the predominant factor, and the
fundamental basis for giving greater protection to the interest of the
property owner no longer exists. Cessante ratione legis cessat et
ipsa lex, say these judges, at least with respect to young, helpless,
children.

9"Those states which still hold out against the doctrine are willing, in
extreme cases, to find some excuse for liability." PRossm, ToRTs 620 (1941).
40 Clifton v. Patroon Operating Corp., 271 App. Div. 122, 63 N. Y. S. 2d
597 (3d Dep't 1946).
41271 App. Div. 122, 129, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 597, 602 (3d Dep't 1946).
42

Carbone v. Mackchil Realty Corp., 296 N. Y. 154, 71 N. E. 2d 447 (1947).
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Perhaps the day is not too distant when, certainly, in considering the doctrine of attractive nuisances, New" York will join the ranks
of those progressive states which subordinate the protection of property interests to personal interests, where serious bodily harm ensues.
It is true that with the humane side of the matter the law cannot be
concerned, but, in view of transmuted concepts as a result of societal
evolution, the law may validly create a legal duty where it otherwise
did not exist. Only in this way can the complete body of the Law
of Torts, in New York, become "a living manifestation of the institutions of a changing political and economic culture."
HAROLD

E.

COLLINS.

RES IPSA LOQUITUR AND EXPLODING BOTTLES

The rule of res ipsa loquitur1 has been a source of confusion in
many of our modern courts, causing many and diverse definitions of
its meaning and purpose.2 As a result we find that different jurisdictions vary widely in their application of the rule, although it would
be safe to say that the rule is now applied in one form or another in
every state of the Union. There was a time, though, when the rule
was not looked upon quite so favorably and the courts were reluctant
to apply it.3
Perhaps the best and most oft-quoted definition of the rule was
that offered by Chief Justice Erle in 1865: 4 "There must be reasonable evidence of negligence; but where the thing is shown to be
under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if
those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that
the accident was from want of care." Thus, when -an accident occurs
under the foregoing rule, an inference, 5 and in some jurisdictions a
1 Literally, "the thing itself speaks."

2 "It adds nothing to the law, has no meaning which is not more clearly
expressed for us in English, and brings confusion to our legal discussions."
Bond, C.J., dissenting in Potomac Edison Co. v. Johnson, 160 Md. 33, 152 Atl.

633 (1930).

3 "If that phrase had not been in Latin, nobody would have called it a
principle." Lord Shaw in Ballard v. North British R. Co., Sess. Cas., H. L.
43 (1923).
4 Scott v. London & St. Katherine Docks Co., 3 H. & C. 596, 159 Eng.
Rep. 665 (Ex. 1865).
5 Jesionowski v. Boston & Maine R. R., 329 U. S. 452, 91 L. ed. 355
(1947); Plumb v. Richmond Light & R. R., 233 N. Y. 285, 135 N. E. 504

